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TRANSFORMATION, POVERTY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SSA 
What Roles for NGO's?
By Reginald Herbold Green
I.
WASTELAND OR LANDS OF HOPE?
1992 is not a good year for most Sub-Saharan Africans. The last time their 
sub-continent saw output rise faster than population for five years in a 
row was 1975-1979. Rapid decline in per capita income may have ended in 
most countries, but for over half the past five years have been bumping 
along the bottom. Even in countries like Ghana and Tanzania with eight 
years of rising GDP and clear trends of rising output and food production 
per capita there is little sense of enthusiasm - the peak output per capita 
levels of the 1960's in Ghana and 1978 in Tanzania are not regained let 
alone the confident enthusiasm of 1950's Ghana or late 1960's/1970‘s 
Tanzania.
And Ghana and Tanzania are today among the most successful of the larger 
states. Zimbabwe's 1980-1991 5% growth trend has collapsed into free fall 
with a remarkably ill articulated structural adjustment phase two (phase 
one was 1984-1991) and drought. The Ivoirian miracle (and its Cameroonians 
mirror) are dust. Kenya's economy is reeling as dangerously as its 
political and social structures.
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From South Africa through the Sudan drought has gripped the people (with
i only Tanzania spared). From the Cape of Good Hope to the Zambesia River
this is the "apocalypse drought" the worst in at least a century. In Gaza 
(Mozambique) they say "When the great river dies the end of the world is at 
hand". In March 1992 (seven months before the next rains) for over 200 
kilometres the Limpopo had died to cracked mud flats and pools. In 
Southern and South African 25,000,000 souls risked famine and in SSA as a 
whole nearly 50,000,000.
2Weak economies, deteriorated infrastructure, eroded state capacity, world 
press boredom with African droughts and parsimonious donor responses (over 
$1,000 million, yes, but under 50% of total requirements) have guaranteed 
deaths from famine even where war is not a noose around the distribution 
pipeline. Where it is and guns shoot the hungry and fires consume the food
- instead of guarding and cooking the food - the four horsemen of the 
apocalypse ride out. Ethiopia, Mozambique, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia is a
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litany of prayers not only for these at risk but also for the dead and the «
doomed to die. The vistas - and not only for the sceptical, aloof onlooker »
- are often those from the gates of hell.
And yet... In Tanzania the proud record of effective food distribution 
averting death by starvation from the end of the 1950's will survive 
1992/93 and the last decade has seen effective, community based, state 
backed child nutrition programmes grow to cover half the country. In 
Southern Africa it was the Southern African Development Community (ex 
Development Coordination Conference), Zimbabwe and Mozambique that first 
sounded the tocsin leading to a set of national responses and just enough 
international support that deaths may be under 50,000 persons not the 
5,000,000 souls one had good cause to fear in March. In Rwanda mediation 
has suspended a civil war/invasion and the first halting steps toward 
reconciliation and return of exiles from the 1960/61 overthrow of the Tutsi 
aristocracy by the Hatu majority have been taken. Even in South Africa 
there are almost as many signs pointing to progress - however agonizingly 
slow - as to a Dantesque downward spiral. However uncertain the outcome 
Nigeria's press gropes toward both freedom and responsibility as does its 
third try at competitive civilian rule. In a majority of countries civil 
society groups (religious, women's, locality based, trade unions and 
others) are growing in vigour and initiative taking. Perhaps - just 
perhaps - 1992-3 is a crisis in the original meaning of that word, a 
turning point.
II.
THE DISMAL SCIENCE REAFFIRMED
But if 1993-2003 is to be the turning point to a return to the social and 
material advances and the optimism of the will common in the 1960's and 
1970's, the cause is unlikely to be found in macroeconomic projections.
3The World Bank and the UN Economic Commission for Africa are at one in 
seeing an average 4% annual rate of growth of output (1% or $4 a person a 
year) as a barely attainable target. And in the 1980's 4% to 5% rates have 
not been enough to reverse the rise of absolute poverty (now afflicting 
almost one household in three) nor to do more than halt the corrosion of 
basic services (health, education, water, extension) or basic 
infrastructure (transport, urban services, communications, energy supply), 
let alone to restore confidence that there is a way forward.
And those 4% estimates assumed a healthy Northern economy - not 1% annual 
growth in the OECD and minus 5% in the former communist states. Inadequate 
as its performance is, Africa is growing faster than Europe! The 
implications both for earned import capacity from exports and resource 
transfers from OECD and ex CMEA governments are as clear as they are dismal 
- quite apart from the rather lurid light they shed on the capacity of 
economic management to overcome structural problems even when of lesser 
magnitude than those confronting SSA!
Transformation (to development or to sustainable growth depending on the 
writer's tastes) is the fashionable answer. But if - as it usually does - 
that means restoring infrastructure, qualitatively improving the education- 
health-nutrition of the labour force and building up a new, dynamic export 
base - as well as the industrial relations and morale to achieve sustained 
labour productivity increases - a decade and a half (at least) separates 
most SSA countries from the promised land.
To be blunt Africans do not have a decade and a half. 3% to 4% growth 
(basically 0% consumption per capita growth) with no reduction of absolute 
poverty or return to living wages is not socially and politically 
sustainable. The process will implode into dull despair or frenetic 
populism at best and explode into mass civil disorder or civil war at 
worst. Either will halt the transformation progress long before it can pay 
off.
About the macroeconomic prospects there is relatively little Northern Non- 
Governmental organisations can do, beyond chipping away at the margins and 
helping prevent shocks destroy otherwise viable national trajectories. 
Publicity and mobilisation in the North do have an impact. But in the 
context of both recession and immediate, nearby challenges in the European 
marches the best outcome of that impact is more likely to be to secure
4backing for emergency appeals, ward off cuts in other transfers and achieve 
major debt writedowns than to win a break through to massive increases in 
real resource transfers. Similarly in their actions in the South the total 
resources NGO's do or can hope to deploy cannot make much impact on the 
overall resource bill or personnel and institutional requirements for 
transformation.
Is there an answer or is Africa's leadership doomed like Moses to die in *
sight of, but unable to reach, their promised post-transformation lands?
And, unlike Moses, with no sign of a Joshua to complete the crossing?
There may be an answer. Counterintuitively it lies in reducing poverty 
(40% plus) and absolute poverty (about 33%). If Africa's poor could be 
enabled to be more productive, the food constraint like that of effective 
demand for urban production would be loosened quite remarkably and output 
growth could be pushed to 5% to 6% a year in a way that allowed the 
majority of poor African households to believe the present was and the 
future could be better (assuredly a sea change in attitude that would lead 
to an unleashing of effort).
This is neither a day dream nor a call for abandoning macro economic 
transformation. The health - education - water - nutrition component of 
the latter is a vital input into the struggle to overcome absolute poverty 
as, potentially, is its stress on infrastructure rehabilitation and 
upgrading. In a very real sense the World Bank's new documents on poverty 
reduction and UNICEF's strategies in partnership with the Organisation of 
African Unity for moving the 1990 Children's Summit goals onto the 
operational agenda are groping in this direction. But neither to date 
appears to have focussed on how poor people can be enabled to produce more 
- quickly and sustainably. In a sense after a lost decade and a half one *
returns to ILO's World Employment Programmes concluding (in effect if not 
intent) valediction Employment. Growth and Basic Needs: A One World •
Problem.
5TRANSFORMING TRANSFORMATION?
If a shift of focus and priority to enabling poor people to improve their 
diets, their access to basic services and to markets, their incomes and 
their ability to achieve changes is central to successful transformation, 
more is needed than a reallocation of central government resources and 
personnel - crucial as those are. Less government is hardly part of the 
answer - even if rather different government is. In most of SSA government 
spending is one third to one half less than the minimum levels the World 
Bank's long term projection study for Sustainable Growth imply are 
necessary. Nor is there any way the bulk of the cash costs of basic 
services and infrastructure can come from poor households, peri-urban 
neighbourhoods and rural communities. More community input frequently 
requires an enhanced core government resource flow to which to contribute.
Local government with real powers - as well as the initiative to use them 
and the capacity to use them efficiently - is part of the answer. So are 
civil society organisations. A central government can design a basic pure 
water strategy involving users in maintenance and operation (physically and 
in provision of materials and cash). It cannot operate if district by 
district let alone well by well from the centre. Similarly using feedback 
on one rigid, unresponsive agricultural extension system (whether the 
current Training and Visit fashion or its predecessors) to design another 
is to repeat the problem - failure to begin by responding to local farmer 
capabilities, needs and practices.
In this context NGO's have - potentially at least - a more pivotal set of 
roles. Their smaller size, greater flexibility (where it exists) and
* attunement both to smaller projects and to a desire to enter - build up
local capacity - move on are potentially relevant to local government and
* civil society in ways main line government to government technical
assistance (no matter how sympathetic the personnel may be) is very 
unlikely to be. This is usually especially true if the NGO has parallel 
domestic civil society bodies to which it can relate.
This perspective on NGO roles does require that they and partner civil
society and local government organisations mobilise more resources. But
the sums are not astronomical and part could well come from SSA 
reallocations to local governments and basic services plus - once results
III.
6began to be seen - community/civil society organisation contributions in 
labour, cash and kind. On the NGO side, provided they can avoid the risk 
of becoming "fronts" for their governments there is no reason most of their 
additional funding needs could not come from fairly moderate government 
financed development assistance augmentation and reallocation.
But finance is not the basic obstacle. Governance, Platonic Guardianship 
and Efficiency are. In SSA even relatively participatory governments with 
strong civil societies have a habit of keeping central control over local 
government, relating at arms length to civil society bodies and to running 
political input from people all the way up to the top and back down rather 
than more directly at community, town and district levels. What the less 
participatory - let alone the positively repressive - do is far worse. 
Platonic guardianship is a constant peril for any person or institution 
which has a vision and is determined to see that others share and benefit 
by it. NGO's should not be quite so happy as some are with the term "New 
Missionaries". At the least it carries Platonic Guardianship overtones 
and, in SSA, usually is a subliminal criticism of perceived links to 
Eurocentric colonial perceptions, attitudes and practices. As to 
efficiency (or more accurately its absence) African local governments in 
general make their central governments look like paragons (and positively 
incite their populations to beg the centre to intervene to clean up the 
rubbish - literally as well as figuratively). Civil society groups are 
much more diverse in respect to efficiency but most lack the personnel, 
knowledge and communications to transform their roles and capacities.
NGO's are in general not very cost efficient - partly because civil society 
bodies' skill base is limited and partly because the "volunteer in the 
village" - or capital - syndrome leads to lavish use of expatriate 
personnel. Nor to date do they, in fact, systematically build up 
sustainable capacity in their partners, with the telling exception of some 
"old missionaries" who have learned from history not to be "new 
missionaries" too, whatever the virtues and necessities of their earlier 
role may have been.
Before exploring civil society/local governance and NGO's in more detail it 
is appropriate to take a quick look at absolute poverty and strategies to 
make overcoming it central to governance and macroeconomic transformation.
7ABSOLUTE POVERTY IN AFRICA
Almost one household in three in Sub-Saharan Africa is afflicted by- 
absolute poverty. They have incomes (cash and self-provisioning) so low 
that 60% of total income cannot procure a minimally acceptable household 
diet. That figure ties with South Asia for the unwanted distinction of 
* being the highest of any region in the world. Worse, it is rising - unlike
South Asia where it is being reduced.
The degree of absolute poverty varies widely. In only three countries is 
it below 10%; in several it is over 50%; in most 20% to 40% of households 
are absolutely poor. Most absolutely poor households are employed/self- 
employed; overwork is a more frequent problem than nothing to do. Indeed 
most have multiple sources of income. Very few households are entirely 
self-provisioning (subsistence) and in many urban areas over 50% of all 
households have one recorded employment ('formal' sector) job. Formal and 
relatively permanent informal (not officially recorded) jobs account for at 
least 60% of urban household income in most of Africa. It is low 
productivity and low pay which underlie absolute poverty not low hours 
worked or low willingness to work. In SSA, access to basic services tends 
to go hand in hand with income (except for being somewhat higher at all 
income levels for urban residents) so that the income and service access 
aspects of absolute poverty are reinforcing in all but a small minority of 
cases.
The causes of poverty need to be understood in order to take effective 
action to overcome it. Absolute poverty is not new - its form has changed 
but its existence is recorded from Ancient Egypt and the Sahelian Empires 
, onward. It has been exacerbated by general economic unsuccess in the 1980s
because, while growing overall resource availability may not benefit poor 
9 households, a shrinking national resource base weighs heavily on poor
people. Natural calamities (especially drought) and man-made catastrophes 
(especially war) have reduced vulnerable households to absolute poverty and 
the absence of livelihood rehabilitation programmes has trapped them there.
But policies are also involved. That is not unique to SSA nor is it 
necessarily a pessimistic judgement. Policies, unlike history, terms of 
trade and drought, can be altered by Africans. Indeed there is reason to
IV.
8believe strategy and policy transformation to focus on reducing (not merely 
alleviating) absolute poverty is both practicable and integral to overall 
macroeconomic policy transformation.
Absolute poverty is not distributed randomly. About 10% is urban and 90% 
rural, although the former has increased more rapidly in the 1980s. In 
rural areas lack of cash income from sources other than food crops,
affliction by calamities and/or catastrophes, location in peripheral areas *
or hostile ecological zones and shortages of labour power (female, aged or 
disabled person headed) are the main identifying, and to a large extent 
causal, categories of absolutely poor households. The main difference in 
urban areas is that absence of at least one formal sector job is a key 
characteristic.
Especially in urban areas, a significant proportion of households are 
unempowerable. The reason is lack of enough labour power relative to 
mouths to feed. Aged, disabled and single adult (overwhelmingly female) 
headed households dominate this category.
Absolute poverty weighs most heavily on absolutely poor people. But it 
also weighs on society - beyond the extended families of the poor who lack 
sources of solidarity support in times of calamity. How a society treats 
its least privileged members does define and inform it.
Further, the moral economy case for priority to reducing absolute poverty 
has economic as well as social and political aspects. Adam Smith stressed 
this in affirming that no nation could be great and prosperous the majority 
of whose people were poor and miserable.
The ill and ill-nourished cannot work long, hard and productively. Wages
rcan be inefficiently low - productivity, morale and morals then deteriorate 
and labour costs per unit of output (which are the crucial cost line not »wages per day) rise. Those with little production or income do not provide 
much in the way either of markets for, or inputs into, the production of 
enterprises or less poor households creating severe demand recession and 
domestic input supply problems. In SSA, neither national physical nor 
household entitlement aspects of food security can be achieved until 
absolutely poor small family farming households are enabled to produce more 
food to sell and to eat.
9Socially and politically it is a well know fact that massive inequality 
does tend to lead to strikes, riots and non-cooperation with employers and 
officials. The social and political costs are clear enough - the 
macroeconomic ones ought to be. Nor is grinding, growing poverty a context 
likely to produce either reasonable stability of policy (or personnel) or 
plausible economic discourse and commitments in a context of competitive 
elections.
*
V. 
NOTES TOWARD A STRATEGY
Absolute poverty will not be overcome by piecemeal tactics, marginal add-on 
projects nor muddling through. A four point strategy - backed by 
substantial policy, institutional, personnel and resource allocations - is 
needed.
1. Enabling poor people to produce and to earn more - including initial 
asset provision and ongoing extension and other productivity raising 
measures;
2. Provision of physical and support for expansion of market (competitive 
traders/transporters with vehicles and working capital) infrastructure;
3. Rehabilitation and expansion of basic services/human investment with 
concentration on basic health services (educational and preventative as 
well as curative), accessible household water, primary and continuing 
(adult) education and basic sanitation;
4. Safety net provision and promotion (for household and community nets)*
including calamity relief, old age and disabled pensions, transfer 
 ^ payments (especially in urban and peri urban areas) to temporarily
(e.g. drought victims and orphans) and permanently unempowerable 
households and persons.
Because the numbers of absolutely poor households is very large, efficiency 
matters both in respect to low unit cost and broad coverage and to rapid 
gains in production and access to services. Programmes which are efficient 
on output tests but have high unit costs are not suitable because adequate 
coverage cannot be achieved.
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This strategy explicitly or implicitly includes macroeconomic 
transformation. Absolute poverty reduction strategies can become self- 
sustaining on fiscal and external balance accounts within five years, but 
cannot cure existing macroeconomic structural imbalances. Both directly, 
via its own employment, and indirectly by enhancing demand for, and 
employment in, the micro and household enterprise sectors, a buoyant large 
scale enterprise sector paying rising (up to efficiency levels) real wages
►is needed. The feedback from the specific articulated strategy into the 
macro package is revival of demand growth, directly backed (particularly in
#
rural areas) by supply (including food and inputs traded with the urban 
sector for manufactured goods). Without overall growth so that "all boats 
float higher", the resources to sustain and absolute poverty reduction 
strategy will not be available. Further, reallocation of new (additional) 
resources in a buoyant economy is infinitely easier (technically and 
economically as well as socially and politically) than reallocating 
existing resources within a stagnant or shrinking economy. Like law and 
order, growth is not adequate, but (also like law and order) without it, 
little else will be achievable and that little with great difficulty and 
high fragility/vulnerability.
VI. 
PARTICIPATION, ACCESS, ADMINISTRATION
Participation by absolutely poor households is necessary - if they do not 
produce more the entire strategy will fail. To achieve results, 
participation must begin in data collection and design and continue through 
operation and maintenance to financing-accountability-review/revision. To 
concentrate on user fees is to parody participation properly defined and, *
indeed, to misjudge how households/communities can best provide resources.
For example, labour, goods, operation and basic maintenance, community *
safety net schemes (as in some aspects of the "Iringa" nutrition 
programmes) may often allow larger as well as less burdensome contributions 
to costs. Participation on that definition requires decentralisation both 
of administration and of governance. Community interaction with and 
accountability over service providers requires, at the very least, strong 
regional and urban government and, as rapidly as possible, strong district 
and town governance and service provision units.
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The way to reach out to enable and serve absolutely poor households is - 
except in the case of safety nets - rarely to create special programmes for 
them alone but to ensure their access to broader articulated programmes. 
Affirmative action is basically about inclusion not exclusion.
That underlines the need to evaluate all programmes and projects in terms 
of their contributions to employment, to earned income of absolutely poor 
households and to provision of services to them. The issue is not whether 
these should be the only criteria - evidently not - nor the overriding ones 
in all cases - again not since, e.g., high cost labour intensive cement 
plants and technically inefficient labour intensive port facilities 
ultimately increase poverty. Rather it is to ensure that employment and 
poor household income criteria are operationally accepted as important 
across the board.
In practice, programmes that benefit absolutely poor households will also 
raise the income and service access of less poor and not so poor ones.
That, in itself, is highly desirable. The problem is in ensuring that 
absolutely poor households do have access to them. Six approaches are 
relevant:
1. rapid advance to universality in respect to basic services (and 
extension) with special, workable fee waivers for absolutely poor 
households;
2. common programmes with specific attention to ensuring absolutely poor 
households do benefit, e.g. initial free tools/seeds packages to enable 
higher production to benefit from - e.g. - local roads and rural 
commercial network strengthening;
3. self selecting approaches, e.g. seasonal (or permanent) labour 
intensive infrastructure construction at wage levels attractive to 
absolutely poor and/or land short (a highly overlapping category) 
households but not to others;
4. self-financing indirect support programmes, e.g. loans and provision of 
training/services to micro enterprises and rural commercial networks;
5. area based approaches when particular districts are largely absolutely 
poor or drought stricken, so that the cost of identifying households to 
exclude is in excess of any conceivable efficiency gain;
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6. safety net programmes for unempowerable (and disaster stricken) 
households on a need-based approach linked to identifiable 
characteristics (which do not include detailed household income 
accounts).
The necessity for cost control - i.e., value for money with value defined 
as enhanced incomes of, and services used by absolutely poor households - 
flows from resource constraints. On fairly optimistic estimates, $20 per 
capita or $60 per capita annually for absolutely poor household members 
($400 to $425 per poor household) can be available in an 'average' SSA 
economy and $150 to $300 per household) in a poorer one. That assumes that 
the 30% of GDP overall public expenditure target derivable from the World 
Bank's Long Term Perspective Study can be achieved; the share to law and 
order, housekeeping, large infrastructural projects and debt service held 
to half that; of the balance, the proportion directed to the struggle 
against absolute poverty, parallels the proportion (30% to 33% on average) 
of absolutely poor people in the population. In a context of 4% to 6% 
growth, substantial reallocation (including a "peace dividend") and 
moderate increases (from new flows or massive external debt write-offs) in 
net resource inflows, those assumptions are potentially attainable.
Institutionally the keys are coordination and decentralisation.
Coordination (at all levels) is needed if strategic programmes are, in 
fact, to complement each other and if a coherent national strategic frame 
to allow decentralised articulation of contextual measures to meet common 
objectives is to have a real existence. Coordination is the opposite of 
parallel government - not new agencies, but strengthened functioning of 
existing ones (including provincial/regional and district, urban, town 
governments) is the appropriate route.
Decentralisation is needed to make participation effective and to allow 
specific variations as to means and emphasis to fit divergent contexts.
How far which functions can be decentralised and how fast is a question of 
fact. If district governments are very weak, professional and technical 
services (albeit not data collection, implementation and participant 
review) will need to remain at provincial level until they are 
strengthened. A budget drawn up without even a qualified bookkeeper, and a
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public works package elaborated without any engineering input, are most 
unlikely to be efficient or operational and will discredit rather than 
promote decentralisation and participation.
VII.
VULNERABILITY'S AFTERMATHS: PREVENTION AND REHABILITATION
Calamity and catastrophe relief as practised today, are survival promoting 
(poverty alleviating) but are not vulnerability reducting and livelihood 
rehabilitating focused. At the same time, adjustment and project 
development programmes are relevant only to households who can respond.
They may be just accessible to poor households, but rarely to those in 
absolute poverty.
This gap is not of purely intellectual interest. It is a yawning chasm 
into which vulnerability has pushed literally millions of African 
households and from which the present disaster relief and development dual 
approaches provide few ladders to climb out again.
This is not inevitable. Calamity (especially drought) programmes need to 
be on a permanently structural standby basis with programmes "on the shelf" 
for fast implementation when (not if) calamity strikes. Key goals include:
a. enabling afflicted households to remain on their farms to prepare for 
the next season (e.g. prompt, nearby food distribution and continued 
access to water);
b. provision of inputs. e.g. seed, and, for wiped out pastoralists, core
livestock to make resumption of production possible;
c. vulnerability reduction measures, e.g. as to water and basic veterinary 
drug supply as well as to socially and economically (not just 
technically) viable drought resistant crop research and extension;
d. public works (food for work or cash paid work for food) both to
contribute to vulnerability reduction and to maintenance of afflicted 
household incomes.
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Catastrophe result reversal (basically after wars) requires a somewhat 
different approach because dislocation is the rule, and the gap in 
livelihood earning as well as the degree of pauperisation, is usually much 
more severe and widespread. The requirements - as set out both by affected 
households and by logical analysis of how to create conditions enabling 
households to benefit from more general development programmes include:
a. adequate security to return home (or to a self chosen, usually nearby, * 
alternative);
%
b. transport back;
c. access to adequate land to restore household livelihood with credible 
security of use rights (usually evolved traditional not titled);
d. packages of tools, basic household equipment and production inputs - 
the working capital without which production cannot be restored;
e. food for the period from return until first attainable harvest (usually 
9 to 15 months because of bush clearing requirements before planting is 
practicable);
f. restoration/creation of access to basic health services, water supply 
and education:
g. roads usable by lorries most of the year;
h. access to a functioning (and preferably competitive) rural trading 
network:
i. supplementary cash income earning opportunities, e.g. from labour
intensive infrastructure restoration. .
VIII. 
WHERE NEXT?
Resources to make a meaningful start do exist. This is especially true if 
they are deployed cost efficiently within a national strategic framework. 
Positive initial results would make further steps easier both by increasing
15
resources available for all uses and by building up groups and institutions 
with vested interests in the successful prosecution of the Struggle Against 
Absolute Poverty.
Mobilising complementary external resources should not be impossible. The 
World Bank and most major bilateral agencies as well as most UN 
institutions are, in fact, convinced that for social, political, economic 
and humanitarian reasons, poverty reduction should be a priority objective.
But the initiative and the frame setting need to be African. No outside 
state or institution (and only a small group of expatriates) is primarily 
concerned with the development of Africa for the benefit of Africans. Even 
less do any of them feel the full cost of failed programmes have a detailed 
human level contextual grasp, or an ability (still less a willingness) to 
be accountable primarily to Africans and African institutions.
Raising external resources for an articulated strategy with clear 
programmes and institutional structures as well as substantial domestic 
resource inputs is desirable, even necessary. Blank page begging for 
foreign donors to come in and do "their thing" is neither.
IX.
CIVIL SOCIETY/LOCAL GOVERNANCE - A SKETCH
To speak of African civil society is to oversimplify - the divergences in 
form and strength are as great as those within Europe. But some moderately 
general observations can be made.
Most African societies do have both a civil society and a pluralist 
tradition (and for that matter of debate on issues before decisions though 
much more rarely of permanent, formalised organisations divided on a 
general political issue basis). But African civil society organisations 
are not what the North now thinks of as NGO's.
The bulk of African civil society organisations are local or local units 
whose national superstructures are often rather weak in relation to the 
base communities and not as hierarchically dominant as they would like to 
think. Locality based groups, religious congregations (Christian, Islamic 
or indigenous), age groups, women's groups. and trade unions (the one
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'modern' form) are dominant. In some cases one or two more 'modern' groups 
- e.g. Red Cross societies - are significant and in many a range of modern 
quasi NGO's (e.g. Boy Scouts, St. John's Ambulance Brigade, Rotary and 
Lions - the two legged variety that is) have a fringe urban elite 
existence. A more recent trend is locality groups focussed on particular 
issues - e.g. parents associations, water users committees - but these are 
a fairly evident evolution of the basic locality groups.
The resilience of many rural civil society organisations is high as - up to 
a point - is their capacity. But their resources (including knowledge) are 
usually a constraint on both volume and variety of activity in rural areas. 
Peri urban and urban centre areas have fewer and weaker civil society 
organisation networks - excepting trade unions and a minority of welfare
oriented religious congregations. Traditional links have eroded under
contextual shift and calamity pressures faster than new forms have emerged.
These are largely "people's organisations" arising organically out of and 
accountable to relatively homogenous, self perceived local or functional 
communities. That explains their weakness in peri urban and urban areas 
and also their underrating by (sometimes to the point of invisibility to) 
many Northern observers. Northern NGO's in the development business (with 
the exception of some church and trade union related ones) are rather 
different in nature. They are groups of self selected persons who share 
common thematic interests and a desire to do something for - or in support 
of - persons not primarily of their own community. They can be styled 
"people's organisation support groups1' but are not - least of all abroad - 
themselves peoples organisations nor in any organic way are they 
accountable to those persons they seek to support or to help. Indigenous
"support groups" as such are both thin on the ground and weak in Africa
(unlike - say - India or the Philippines). The major exceptions are 
located in the broader levels of civil society groups with national 
linkages (e.g. church and women's councils). Like external NGO's they 
often have difficulty in understanding, being understood by or relating 
with “people's organisations". That is a weakness which interlocks with 
civil society organisation weaknesses in respect of knowledge and skilled 
personnel. Community, tradition, highly contextual knowledge can take are 
only so far in changing contexts and to day neither indigenous "support 
groups" nor NGO's have been able to address this constraint more than 
occasionally or peripherally.
17
At local governance levels - particularly in respect to villages or (in a 
minority of cases where civil society groups are strong) and peri urban 
neighbourhoods civil society organisations and formal local government 
interpenetrate. This can be to the point at which an analyst is hard put 
to divide them and most constituents would hardly see the exercise as 
having much point. This could be a strength for both were the base tiers 
of local government less weak and the structuring of scarce district (in 
states with more capacity) and provincial (in the less capacitated ones) 
skilled/professionally personnel more oriented to supporting the base 
units. At present it is a mixed blessing (or shared curse).
Beyond local government - civil society/government relations vary widely. 
Probably the commonest is general neglect (not by any means always benign) 
mixed with non-comprehension and a mutual wariness if either appear to be 
becoming powerful and/or critical. Repression (usually barely successful 
if overt and likely to end by eroding the state without necessarily 
strengthening the capacity of the civil society organisations to promote 
and to do as distinct from to reject and to block) is common. Co-optation
- whether in good faith or to tame - is a less common strategy, albeit one
practiced in several major countries where it is backed by the threat of
repression. Its latest variant is an attempt to offload service provision
and revenue collection onto civil society bodies in a manner strongly 
suggesting that neither better services nor more participatory service 
design - let alone more accountability - is the main aim whatever the cover 
glosses may affirm.
However, to point a totally negative picture would be inaccurate. Some of 
the neglect is benign - to leave space to act. Consultation and dialogue, 
with varying degrees of seriousness, are becoming more common. Some "users 
committee" approaches really do incorporate participation and more 
accountability, better services as well as more civil society inputs of 
time, materials and money.
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X.
NGO's - PROMISE OR PROBLEM?
Clearly African "people's organisations" and "support groups" could use 
partners and supporters. Many are well aware of that fact. Equally 
clearly Northern NGO's are eager to plav these roles and are currently "in 
fashion" in the North. But to date the results - and especially the 
growing resentment among many African people's and support group members 
and leaders - are disquietina. NGO's seem relatively unaware of this 
"backlash" - perhaps because Africans are often too polite in discourse and 
perhaps because Northern NGO's like their Northern Government big brothers 
are perceived as not really welcoming criticism and as being quite prone to 
moving their marbles to a different game if the African players complain of 
their rules. The most scorching critiques to date (e.g. Joe Hanlon's 
Mozambique - Who Calls the Shots?! are by Northerners. They probably 
exaggerate and do not quite see the problem through African eyes, but there 
is a rapidly growing body of African support for their main challenges to 
the current Northern NGO global view/African field practice.
Foreign NGO's are external - in style and in accountability. To suppose 
(as some do and others pretend) the reverse, leads to failure to seek 
mutual accommodation to these realities. Their level of expertise is all 
over the map - even in the same organisation - ranging from superlative to 
non-existent and their level of understanding of realities and of 
priorities as perceived by civil society organisations is, on average, 
little better than that of their official technical assistance brethren.
While NGO's like to believe that they, unlike external governments, do not 
dominate, that is usually an illusion as seen from the African perspective. 
The very real disproportion of resources, of personnel of external links, 
of access to those in power (including in African governments) and of 
prestige between an NGO and a local civil society or governance body is 
objectively frequently greater than that between a resource providing and a 
recipient state. To ignore this is to make focussing on how to reduce the 
disparity, build up African capacity (and thus countervailing power) and to 
transcend didactic monologues with participatory dialogues harder and less 
likely.
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NGO styles also create operational problems. In one very poor SSA country 
over sixty are listed (oddly not including the largest Protestant/Anglican 
and Catholic cooperating NGO's because they operate through their national 
counterparts, have no permanent offices but - on their home government's 
evaluation - get better than average value for money). For example 5 
OXFAM's, 4 Save The Children's, 4 Medicines sans Frontiers (apparently 
except boundaries between each other) all have offices. The problems of 
liaison (even nationally let alone for local government or peoples 
organisations) are virtually insurmountable. This problem is enhanced by a 
number of NGO's having scattered, specialised (at least in one place) 
projects and wishing to have a fairly rapid in - do the job - out and on 
cycle. The result is all too often passive acceptance of whatever is 'on 
offer', no coordination of the external NGO's and a litter of unsustained 
ex-proiects for whose sustainability neither domestic expertise nor 
resource bases had been built up. Efficiency does matter and at least from 
an African perspective these styles are inefficient and tolerated only from 
fear basic criticisms would lead to mass exodus to more complaisant venues.
To cite these limitations (or worse) is not to deny the dedication and 
energy many NGO's and their personnel have demonstrated. Nor is it to deny 
the potential for much more constructive interaction; still less to 
advocate rapid withdrawal. It is to ask "What is to be done" to achieve 
that potential primarily through more sensitive, accountable, partnerships 
with African "support groups", "peoples organisations" and local 
government.
XI. 
A FEW SIGNPOSTS
1. Building African capacity is the prime purpose for and justification of 
partnership. Only in emergency life threatening situations does 
getting the immediate task done faster justify compromising that 
principle;
2. Apart from external publicitv/mobilisation against repression (when, 
how and as sought) NGO's need to concentrate on enabling their partners 
t o build up the knowledge, personnel and organisation to carry out 
dialogue (including tense dialogue) with their governments - not to try
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to design their domestic political strategies or wage campaigns for 
them. Possible (and desirable) relationships among civil society 
organisations and different levels of governance vary widely. From 
country to country and overtime. A uniform choice to act as if 
government were not there (the inverse of governmental neglect of civil 
society) is not appropriate. Still less is a general stance of open 
distrust and covert attempts to undermine state capacity (the inverse 
of repressive co-optation). But there are, indeed, contexts in which 
these may be the only practicable ways ahead. The points are: a)
relating to context and b) the primary of African (not NGO) decisions 
if only because it is the Africans who must continue to live in the 
contexts and with the consequences;
3. NGO's should structure their programme and project choices (and 
geographic foci) largely in response to perceived partner needs and 
capacities. By the some token programme duration needs to relate to 
sustainable domestic capacity buildup and, therefore, can rarely be set 
in advance;
4. Both inexpert and insensitive expatriate personnel are something of 
which SSA already has a large surplus and which contribute nothing (or 
less than nothing) to African civil society or local government 
capacity building;
5. The difficulty of working to and through domestic organisations is real 
- but those NGO's determined to overcome it have done so often enough 
to suggest the greatest barrier to NGO's doing this is pessimism of the 
will. Learning by experience is crucial and it is crucial that 
experience be built into abiding African groups not encapsulated in 
transient expatriates;
6. The imbalance of resources and of influence between external NGO’s and 
their African partners needs to be recognised openly in order to devise 
agreed ways to reduce its distorting impact on relationships;
7. NGO's should consider how their own space to operate can be reconciled 
with the limited administrative and liaison capacity of most of their 
African partners, as well as with African interaction and coordination 
with national (as well as local and particular) strategic and goal 
frameworks:
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8. NGO programme and project concepts (like those of governments) should 
be scrutinised for cost efficiency and sustainability (in terms of 
knowledge, personnel and central government access as well as of 
finance) to reduce the growing debris of abandoned (before or after the 
NGO moved on leaving the fallout to its partners - or clients).
"Parish churches in a wasteland", however small, are no more monuments 
to God or to the persons who built them than “Cathedrals in the 
desert".
None of these signposts points down a path posted “no through road". But 
the roads are likely to prove long, winding, steep and strewn with 
obstacles circumventing or digging out of which require time, skill, energy 
and faith. To cite the Lord Krishnas injunction on a rather different 
field of battle:
Not farewell, but 
Fare forward 
Voyagers.
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